Files
hbb_common/protos/rendezvous.proto
T
rustdeskandClaude Fable 5.1 e272fede36 tcp: key exchange version 1, one stream key per direction
Version 1 of the key exchange splits the exchanged key into a subkey per
direction, the way Noise splits its cipher states after the handshake, and
leaves the nonce layout and the handshake messages as they are. Each subkey
is a keyed BLAKE2b over the handshake transcript: both ephemeral public keys,
the version the responder advertised and the one the initiator picked, so a
change to any of it in transit leaves the two sides with different keys. The
original scheme is version 0, which is also what an absent field means.

Negotiated through new fields old peers do not see: the side that speaks
first advertises the newest version it has (`KeyExchange.version` from the
server, `IdPk.kx_version` inside the signed identity from the controlled
side), the other side answers with the highest both have, and the pair runs
that. Any old peer on either end keeps today's stream byte for byte. The
controlled side's advertisement sits inside the signature; the server's is
repeated in `RendezvousMessage.kx_advertised` on its first message after the
exchange, inside the encrypted channel, and a client that was shown a
different value in the clear refuses the stream.

`Encrypt::new` is unchanged; `new_split`, `set_key_split` and
`check_kx_advertised` are added beside it, and `box_pk_of` for a responder
that kept only the secret half of its ephemeral pair. The tests pin the
version 0 output as well as the split and the echo.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019aokqJuhjvB3kijXtAg5Ns
2026-09-21 18:33:33 +08:00

306 lines
7.1 KiB
Protocol Buffer

syntax = "proto3";
package hbb;
message IdPk {
string id = 1;
bytes pk = 2;
// DTLS certificate fingerprint of the signer's WebRTC endpoint, signed together with id/pk so
// a WebRTC peer's DTLS channel can be bound to its verified identity (defeats a rendezvous/relay
// that swaps SDP fingerprints). Empty for non-WebRTC handshakes.
string dtls_fingerprint = 3;
// Newest key exchange version the signer speaks; absent, i.e. 0, is the original scheme.
// Inside the signed identity so a rendezvous or relay cannot lower it.
uint32 kx_version = 4;
}
message RegisterPeer {
string id = 1;
int32 serial = 2;
}
enum ConnType {
DEFAULT_CONN = 0;
FILE_TRANSFER = 1;
PORT_FORWARD = 2;
RDP = 3;
VIEW_CAMERA = 4;
TERMINAL = 5;
}
message RegisterPeerResponse { bool request_pk = 2; }
message PunchHoleRequest {
string id = 1;
NatType nat_type = 2;
string licence_key = 3;
ConnType conn_type = 4;
string token = 5;
string version = 6;
int32 udp_port = 7;
bool force_relay = 8;
int32 upnp_port = 9;
bytes socket_addr_v6 = 10;
string switch_code = 11;
// The offer's envelope declares its own ICE transport policy (`ice_policy` key inside
// the webrtc:// payload): under force_relay it tells the peer whether the relay is
// transport-forced (WebSocket — answer may use full ICE) or policy (Relay-only + TURN).
string webrtc_sdp_offer = 12;
}
message ControlPermissions {
enum Permission {
keyboard = 0;
remote_printer = 1;
clipboard = 2;
file = 3;
audio = 4;
camera = 5;
terminal = 6;
tunnel = 7;
restart = 8;
recording = 9;
block_input = 10;
remote_modify = 11;
privacy_mode = 12;
}
uint64 permissions = 1;
}
message ControlledContext {
string conn_audit_ref = 1;
}
message PunchHole {
bytes socket_addr = 1;
string relay_server = 2;
NatType nat_type = 3;
int32 udp_port = 4;
bool force_relay = 5;
int32 upnp_port = 6;
bytes socket_addr_v6 = 7;
ControlPermissions control_permissions = 8;
ControlledContext controlled_context = 9;
string webrtc_sdp_offer = 10;
}
message TestNatRequest {
int32 serial = 1;
}
// per my test, uint/int has no difference in encoding, int not good for negative, use sint for negative
message TestNatResponse {
int32 port = 1;
ConfigUpdate cu = 2; // for mobile
}
enum NatType {
UNKNOWN_NAT = 0;
ASYMMETRIC = 1;
SYMMETRIC = 2;
}
message PunchHoleSent {
bytes socket_addr = 1;
string id = 2;
string relay_server = 3;
NatType nat_type = 4;
string version = 5;
int32 upnp_port = 6;
bytes socket_addr_v6 = 7;
string webrtc_sdp_answer = 8;
}
message RegisterPk {
string id = 1;
bytes uuid = 2;
bytes pk = 3;
string old_id = 4;
bool no_register_device = 5;
}
message RegisterPkResponse {
enum Result {
OK = 0;
UUID_MISMATCH = 2;
ID_EXISTS = 3;
TOO_FREQUENT = 4;
INVALID_ID_FORMAT = 5;
NOT_SUPPORT = 6;
SERVER_ERROR = 7;
NOT_DEPLOYED = 8;
}
Result result = 1;
int32 keep_alive = 2;
}
message PunchHoleResponse {
bytes socket_addr = 1;
bytes pk = 2;
enum Failure {
ID_NOT_EXIST = 0;
OFFLINE = 2;
LICENSE_MISMATCH = 3;
LICENSE_OVERUSE = 4;
}
Failure failure = 3;
string relay_server = 4;
oneof union {
NatType nat_type = 5;
bool is_local = 6;
}
string other_failure = 7;
int32 feedback = 8;
bool is_udp = 9;
int32 upnp_port = 10;
bytes socket_addr_v6 = 11;
string webrtc_sdp_answer = 12;
}
message ConfigUpdate {
int32 serial = 1;
repeated string rendezvous_servers = 2;
}
message RequestRelay {
string id = 1;
string uuid = 2;
bytes socket_addr = 3;
string relay_server = 4;
bool secure = 5;
string licence_key = 6;
ConnType conn_type = 7;
string token = 8;
ControlPermissions control_permissions = 9;
ControlledContext controlled_context = 10;
string switch_code = 11;
}
message RelayResponse {
bytes socket_addr = 1;
string uuid = 2;
string relay_server = 3;
oneof union {
string id = 4;
bytes pk = 5;
}
string refuse_reason = 6;
string version = 7;
int32 feedback = 9;
bytes socket_addr_v6 = 10;
int32 upnp_port = 11;
string webrtc_sdp_answer = 12;
}
message SoftwareUpdate { string url = 1; }
// if in same intranet, punch hole won't work both for udp and tcp,
// even some router has below connection error if we connect itself,
// { kind: Other, error: "could not resolve to any address" },
// so we request local address to connect.
message FetchLocalAddr {
bytes socket_addr = 1;
string relay_server = 2;
bytes socket_addr_v6 = 3;
ControlPermissions control_permissions = 4;
ControlledContext controlled_context = 5;
}
message LocalAddr {
bytes socket_addr = 1;
bytes local_addr = 2;
string relay_server = 3;
string id = 4;
string version = 5;
bytes socket_addr_v6 = 6;
}
message PeerDiscovery {
string cmd = 1;
string mac = 2;
string id = 3;
string username = 4;
string hostname = 5;
string platform = 6;
string misc = 7;
}
message OnlineRequest {
string id = 1;
repeated string peers = 2;
}
message OnlineResponse {
bytes states = 1;
}
message KeyExchange {
repeated bytes keys = 1;
// From the server: the newest key exchange version it speaks. From the client: the version it
// picked, the highest both speak. Absent, i.e. 0, is the original scheme.
uint32 version = 2;
}
message HealthCheck {
string token = 1;
}
message HeaderEntry {
string name = 1;
string value = 2;
}
message HttpProxyRequest {
string method = 1;
string path = 2;
repeated HeaderEntry headers = 3;
bytes body = 4;
}
message HttpProxyResponse {
int32 status = 1;
repeated HeaderEntry headers = 2;
bytes body = 3;
string error = 4;
}
message IceCandidate {
string id = 1;
bytes socket_addr = 2;
string session_key = 3;
string candidate = 4;
}
message RendezvousMessage {
oneof union {
RegisterPeer register_peer = 6;
RegisterPeerResponse register_peer_response = 7;
PunchHoleRequest punch_hole_request = 8;
PunchHole punch_hole = 9;
PunchHoleSent punch_hole_sent = 10;
PunchHoleResponse punch_hole_response = 11;
FetchLocalAddr fetch_local_addr = 12;
LocalAddr local_addr = 13;
ConfigUpdate configure_update = 14;
RegisterPk register_pk = 15;
RegisterPkResponse register_pk_response = 16;
SoftwareUpdate software_update = 17;
RequestRelay request_relay = 18;
RelayResponse relay_response = 19;
TestNatRequest test_nat_request = 20;
TestNatResponse test_nat_response = 21;
PeerDiscovery peer_discovery = 22;
OnlineRequest online_request = 23;
OnlineResponse online_response = 24;
KeyExchange key_exchange = 25;
HealthCheck hc = 26;
HttpProxyRequest http_proxy_request = 27;
HttpProxyResponse http_proxy_response = 28;
IceCandidate ice_candidate = 29;
}
// From the server, on its first message after a key exchange: the version it advertised,
// repeated inside the encrypted channel where nothing in transit can alter it. A client that
// was shown a different value in the clear knows the handshake was altered and refuses the
// stream. Absent from servers that predate versions.
uint32 kx_advertised = 30;
}