feat: WebRTC data-plane framing, DTLS binding, and pc-leak fixes

- 1-byte-header fragmentation past the 64KB SCTP cap; empty-message and clean-EOF handling
- is_relayed() via selected candidate-pair stats for the direct/relayed flag
- IdPk.dtls_fingerprint + rendezvous webrtc SDP/IceCandidate proto fields
- fix pc leaks: Weak capture breaks the state-handler Arc self-cycle; close pc on new() error paths

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
rustdesk
2026-07-22 11:17:30 +08:00
parent cc8138a42e
commit 9f5a296890
5 changed files with 494 additions and 85 deletions
+2 -2
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@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ rustls-pki-types = "1.11"
rustls-native-certs = "0.8"
webpki-roots = "1.0.4"
async-recursion = "1.1"
webrtc = { version = "0.14.0", optional = true }
webrtc = { version = "0.13.0", optional = true }
libloading = "0.8"
[target.'cfg(not(any(target_os = "android", target_os = "ios")))'.dependencies]
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ protobuf-codegen = { version = "3.7" }
[dev-dependencies]
clap = "4.5.51"
webrtc = "0.14.0"
webrtc = "0.13.0"
[target.'cfg(target_os = "windows")'.dependencies]
winapi = { version = "0.3", features = [
+4
View File
@@ -38,6 +38,10 @@ message VideoFrame {
message IdPk {
string id = 1;
bytes pk = 2;
// DTLS certificate fingerprint of the signer's WebRTC endpoint, signed together with id/pk so
// a WebRTC peer's DTLS channel can be bound to its verified identity (defeats a rendezvous/relay
// that swaps SDP fingerprints). Empty for non-WebRTC handshakes.
string dtls_fingerprint = 3;
}
message DisplayInfo {
+4 -2
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@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ use tokio_util::codec::{Decoder, Encoder};
// Bound speculative allocation from untrusted frame headers.
const MAX_PREALLOCATED_PAYLOAD_LEN: usize = 256 * 1024;
/// Largest payload representable by the four-byte RustDesk frame header.
pub const MAX_FRAME_LENGTH: usize = 0x3FFF_FFFF;
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy)]
pub struct BytesCodec {
@@ -132,7 +134,7 @@ impl Encoder<Bytes> for BytesCodec {
let h = (data.len() << 2) as u32 | 0x2;
buf.put_u16_le((h & 0xFFFF) as u16);
buf.put_u8((h >> 16) as u8);
} else if data.len() <= 0x3FFFFFFF {
} else if data.len() <= MAX_FRAME_LENGTH {
buf.put_u32_le((data.len() << 2) as u32 | 0x3);
} else {
return Err(io::Error::new(io::ErrorKind::InvalidInput, "Overflow"));
@@ -290,7 +292,7 @@ mod tests {
fn decode_large_frame_header_caps_preallocation() {
let mut codec = BytesCodec::new();
let mut buf = BytesMut::new();
let n = 0x3FFFFFFFusize;
let n = MAX_FRAME_LENGTH;
const MAX_REASONABLE_CAPACITY: usize = MAX_PREALLOCATED_PAYLOAD_LEN * 4;
buf.put_u32_le((n << 2) as u32 | 0x3);
+58
View File
@@ -74,6 +74,64 @@ impl Stream {
}
}
/// Whether this is a WebRTC transport. Used to enforce the WebRTC-only DTLS fingerprint
/// binding (fail closed) in the secure handshake.
#[inline]
pub fn is_webrtc(&self) -> bool {
match self {
#[cfg(feature = "webrtc")]
Stream::WebRTC(_) => true,
#[allow(unreachable_patterns)]
_ => false,
}
}
/// Close the underlying WebRTC peer connection if this is a WebRTC stream; no-op otherwise.
/// A WebRTC pc is kept alive by the global session cache and its cleanup handler only fires on
/// a terminal ICE state, so it must be closed explicitly at session end. TCP/WebSocket streams
/// release their resources on drop and need nothing here.
#[inline]
pub async fn close_webrtc(&self) {
match self {
#[cfg(feature = "webrtc")]
Stream::WebRTC(s) => s.close().await,
#[allow(unreachable_patterns)]
_ => {}
}
}
/// Whether an established WebRTC transport runs through a TURN relay (used for the UI's
/// direct/relayed flag). None for non-WebRTC transports or before ICE selects a pair.
#[inline]
pub async fn webrtc_relayed(&self) -> Option<bool> {
match self {
#[cfg(feature = "webrtc")]
Stream::WebRTC(s) => s.is_relayed().await,
#[allow(unreachable_patterns)]
_ => None,
}
}
/// DTLS certificate fingerprint for a WebRTC stream (`local`=true for this endpoint's own
/// cert, false for the peer's), used to bind the channel to the signed peer identity.
/// Returns None for non-WebRTC transports, which authenticate via the secretbox key exchange.
#[inline]
#[cfg_attr(not(feature = "webrtc"), allow(unused_variables))]
pub async fn dtls_fingerprint(&self, local: bool) -> Option<String> {
match self {
#[cfg(feature = "webrtc")]
Stream::WebRTC(s) => {
if local {
s.local_dtls_fingerprint().await.ok()
} else {
s.remote_dtls_fingerprint().await.ok()
}
}
#[allow(unreachable_patterns)]
_ => None,
}
}
#[inline]
pub async fn next_timeout(
&mut self,
+426 -81
View File
@@ -1,28 +1,33 @@
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::io::{Error, ErrorKind};
use std::net::{IpAddr, Ipv4Addr, SocketAddr};
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex as StdMutex};
use std::time::Duration;
use webrtc::api::setting_engine::SettingEngine;
use webrtc::api::APIBuilder;
use webrtc::data::data_channel::DataChannel as DetachedDataChannel;
use webrtc::data_channel::RTCDataChannel;
use webrtc::ice::mdns::MulticastDnsMode;
use webrtc::ice_transport::ice_candidate::RTCIceCandidateInit;
use webrtc::ice_transport::ice_candidate_type::RTCIceCandidateType;
use webrtc::ice_transport::ice_server::RTCIceServer;
use webrtc::peer_connection::configuration::RTCConfiguration;
use webrtc::peer_connection::peer_connection_state::RTCPeerConnectionState;
use webrtc::peer_connection::policy::ice_transport_policy::RTCIceTransportPolicy;
use webrtc::peer_connection::sdp::session_description::RTCSessionDescription;
use webrtc::peer_connection::RTCPeerConnection;
use webrtc::stats::StatsReportType;
use base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD as BASE64_STANDARD;
use base64::Engine;
use bytes::{Bytes, BytesMut};
use bytes::{BufMut, Bytes, BytesMut};
use tokio::sync::{mpsc, watch, Mutex};
use tokio::time::timeout;
use url::Url;
use crate::bytes_codec::MAX_FRAME_LENGTH;
use crate::config;
use crate::protobuf::Message;
use crate::sodiumoxide::crypto::secretbox::Key;
@@ -42,12 +47,41 @@ pub struct WebRTCStream {
local_ice_rx: Arc<StdMutex<Option<mpsc::UnboundedReceiver<String>>>>,
session_key: String,
send_timeout: u64,
// Built with Relay-only ICE policy (force_relay): every selected pair goes through TURN.
relay_only: bool,
// Detached data channel, cached after the first `detach()` so send/recv do not re-lock and
// re-fetch it per message. Shared across clones; `detach()` is idempotent.
detached: Arc<Mutex<Option<Arc<DetachedDataChannel>>>>,
// Receive-side reassembly state, guarded by a single mutex so the fragment accumulator
// survives `next()` cancellation (e.g. `next_timeout`) instead of losing already-read
// fragments mid-message. Assumes a single reader, consistent with the rest of the stream API.
recv_state: Arc<Mutex<RecvState>>,
// True once the controller has completed the RustDesk identity binding (DTLS fingerprint
// matched to the signed peer id, via `set_key`). DTLS always encrypts; this flag mirrors TCP's
// "secured after key exchange" so key-less / unbound WebRTC is not shown as peer-authenticated.
peer_verified: Arc<AtomicBool>,
}
/// Standard maximum message size for WebRTC data channels (RFC 8831, 65535 bytes).
/// Most browsers, including Chromium, enforce this protocol limit.
const DATA_CHANNEL_BUFFER_SIZE: u16 = u16::MAX;
#[derive(Default)]
struct RecvState {
// Accumulated payload of the logical message currently being reassembled.
acc: BytesMut,
// Reused read scratch buffer, avoiding a per-message allocation.
scratch: Vec<u8>,
}
// The SCTP data channel's 65536-byte max message size is handled by
// splitting a logical message into fragments carrying a 1-byte header. Fragment payload is kept
// well under the limit so header+payload never reaches the exact-65536 boundary that the
// receiver's reassembly would truncate with data loss.
const MAX_FRAGMENT_PAYLOAD: usize = 60000;
/// Receive scratch size: must be >= 1 (fragment header) + `MAX_FRAGMENT_PAYLOAD` and fit the
/// negotiated SCTP max message size.
const RECV_BUF_SIZE: usize = 64 * 1024;
/// Fragment header byte: more fragments follow for this logical message.
const FRAG_MORE: u8 = 1;
/// Fragment header byte: final (or only) fragment of a logical message.
const FRAG_END: u8 = 0;
// use 3 public STUN servers to find out the NAT type, 2 must be the same address but different ports
// https://stackoverflow.com/questions/72805316/determine-nat-mapping-behaviour-using-two-stun-servers
// luckily nextcloud supports two ports for STUN
@@ -71,6 +105,10 @@ impl Clone for WebRTCStream {
local_ice_rx: self.local_ice_rx.clone(),
session_key: self.session_key.clone(),
send_timeout: self.send_timeout,
relay_only: self.relay_only,
detached: self.detached.clone(),
recv_state: self.recv_state.clone(),
peer_verified: self.peer_verified.clone(),
}
}
}
@@ -128,12 +166,25 @@ impl WebRTCStream {
Ok(fingerprint.to_string())
}
/// Process-local SESSIONS-map key: the DTLS fingerprint prefixed by role. An offerer and an
/// answerer that share a fingerprint (a single process connecting to its own id) would
/// otherwise collide, handing the offerer back as the answerer. The wire-level `session_key`
/// used for ICE-candidate routing stays the bare fingerprint so both peers still match.
#[inline]
fn cache_key(fingerprint: &str, is_offerer: bool) -> String {
format!(
"{}:{}",
if is_offerer { "offer" } else { "answer" },
fingerprint
)
}
#[inline]
fn get_key_for_sdp_json(sdp_json: &str) -> ResultType<String> {
if sdp_json.is_empty() {
return Ok("".to_string());
}
let sdp = serde_json::from_str::<RTCSessionDescription>(&sdp_json)?;
let sdp = serde_json::from_str::<RTCSessionDescription>(sdp_json)?;
Self::get_key_for_sdp(&sdp)
}
@@ -177,6 +228,17 @@ impl WebRTCStream {
}
}
/// Whether the ICE configuration contains a usable TURN server. A Relay-policy peer
/// connection (force_relay) can only gather relay candidates, so without a TURN server it can
/// never connect — callers use this to skip building a guaranteed-dead pc.
pub fn has_turn_server() -> bool {
Self::get_ice_servers().iter().any(|s| {
s.urls
.iter()
.any(|u| u.starts_with("turn:") || u.starts_with("turns:"))
})
}
#[inline]
fn get_ice_servers() -> Vec<RTCIceServer> {
let mut ice_servers = Vec::new();
@@ -217,7 +279,12 @@ impl WebRTCStream {
force_relay: bool,
ms_timeout: u64,
) -> ResultType<Self> {
log::debug!("New webrtc stream to endpoint: {}", remote_endpoint);
// The endpoint contains a Base64-encoded SDP with host addresses and live ICE
// credentials. Log only its size so debug logs cannot disclose that information.
log::debug!(
"New webrtc stream (remote endpoint: {} bytes)",
remote_endpoint.len()
);
let remote_offer = if remote_endpoint.is_empty() {
"".into()
} else {
@@ -225,16 +292,16 @@ impl WebRTCStream {
};
let mut key = Self::get_key_for_sdp_json(&remote_offer)?;
let sessions_lock = SESSIONS.lock().await;
if let Some(cached_stream) = sessions_lock.get(&key) {
if !key.is_empty() {
let start_local_offer = remote_offer.is_empty();
if !key.is_empty() {
let sessions_lock = SESSIONS.lock().await;
if let Some(cached_stream) =
sessions_lock.get(&Self::cache_key(&key, start_local_offer))
{
log::debug!("Start webrtc with cached peer");
return Ok(cached_stream.clone());
}
}
drop(sessions_lock);
let start_local_offer = remote_offer.is_empty();
// Create a SettingEngine and enable Detach
let mut s = SettingEngine::default();
s.detach_data_channels();
@@ -284,7 +351,14 @@ impl WebRTCStream {
let bootstrap_dc = if start_local_offer {
let dc_open_notify = notify_tx.clone();
// Create a data channel with label "bootstrap"
let dc = pc.create_data_channel("bootstrap", None).await?;
let dc = match pc.create_data_channel("bootstrap", None).await {
Ok(dc) => dc,
Err(e) => {
// Close before propagating: the pc is live and would otherwise leak.
pc.close().await.ok();
return Err(e.into());
}
};
dc.on_open(Box::new(move || {
log::debug!("Local data channel bootstrap open.");
let _ = dc_open_notify.send(WebRTCConnectionState::Open);
@@ -321,7 +395,12 @@ impl WebRTCStream {
// This will notify you when the peer has connected/disconnected
let stream_for_close = stream.clone();
let pc_for_close = pc.clone();
// Weak, not strong: a handler stored inside the pc that captured a strong
// `Arc<RTCPeerConnection>` forms a pc -> internal -> handler -> pc cycle that `close()`
// never breaks (it only fires the handler) and no `Drop` clears, permanently leaking every
// pc and the ICE-candidate sender's forwarding task. Upgrade inside the handler; if the pc
// is already gone there is nothing left in SESSIONS to evict.
let pc_for_close = Arc::downgrade(&pc);
pc.on_peer_connection_state_change(Box::new(move |s: RTCPeerConnectionState| {
let stream_for_close2 = stream_for_close.clone();
let on_connection_notify = notify_tx.clone();
@@ -329,21 +408,35 @@ impl WebRTCStream {
Box::pin(async move {
log::debug!("WebRTC session peer connection state: {}", s);
match s {
RTCPeerConnectionState::Disconnected
| RTCPeerConnectionState::Failed
| RTCPeerConnectionState::Closed => {
// `Disconnected` is a transient, recoverable ICE state (webrtc-ice fires it
// after ~5s without consent and returns to `Connected` when traffic resumes).
// Only tear down on the terminal states so a short network blip (Wi-Fi roam,
// sleep/wake, cell handover) does not permanently kill an established session.
RTCPeerConnectionState::Failed | RTCPeerConnectionState::Closed => {
let _ = on_connection_notify.send(WebRTCConnectionState::Closed(
s.to_string(),
));
log::debug!("WebRTC session closing due to disconnected");
log::debug!("WebRTC session closing due to {}", s);
let _ = stream_for_close2.lock().await.close().await;
log::debug!("WebRTC session stream closed");
let Some(pc_for_close2) = pc_for_close2.upgrade() else {
return;
};
let mut sessions_lock = SESSIONS.lock().await;
match Self::get_key_for_peer(&pc_for_close2, start_local_offer).await {
Ok(k) => {
sessions_lock.remove(&k);
log::debug!("WebRTC session removed key: {}", k);
Ok(fingerprint) => {
let k = Self::cache_key(&fingerprint, start_local_offer);
// Only evict if the cached entry IS this pc: a duplicate offer
// resolves to the same key, and closing the discarded duplicate pc
// must not remove the live winner sharing that key.
if sessions_lock
.get(&k)
.is_some_and(|s| Arc::ptr_eq(&s.pc, &pc_for_close2))
{
sessions_lock.remove(&k);
log::debug!("WebRTC session removed key: {}", k);
}
}
Err(e) => {
log::error!(
@@ -374,31 +467,45 @@ impl WebRTCStream {
}));
// process offer/answer
if start_local_offer {
let sdp = pc.create_offer(None).await?;
pc.set_local_description(sdp.clone()).await?;
log::debug!("local offer:\n{}", sdp.sdp);
// get local sdp key
key = Self::get_key_for_sdp(&sdp)?;
log::debug!("Start webrtc with local key: {}", key);
} else {
let sdp = serde_json::from_str::<RTCSessionDescription>(&remote_offer)?;
pc.set_remote_description(sdp.clone()).await?;
let answer = pc.create_answer(None).await?;
pc.set_local_description(answer).await?;
log::debug!("remote offer:\n{}", sdp.sdp);
// get remote sdp key
key = Self::get_key_for_sdp(&sdp)?;
log::debug!("Start webrtc with remote key: {}", key);
}
let mut final_lock = SESSIONS.lock().await;
if let Some(session) = final_lock.get(&key) {
pc.close().await.ok();
return Ok(session.clone());
//
// Trickle ICE: the local description is returned WITHOUT waiting for candidate gathering
// (candidates stream out via `take_local_ice_rx` afterwards), so this block is local-only
// work — pc construction, DTLS cert keygen, SDP marshal — at sub-millisecond cost. The
// controlled side awaits answer creation inline on its punch-reply critical path and
// relies on that: adding any gathering/network wait here would delay the TCP/UDP
// hole-punch reply for every connection.
// Any failure below leaves a live pc with handlers already registered; its state handler
// only fires on a terminal ICE state, so a bare `?`-drop would leak it (remotely
// triggerable: a crafted `type:"answer"` offer passes the JSON+fingerprint pre-check but
// fails `set_remote_description`). Close the pc before propagating any such error.
let offer_answer: ResultType<String> = async {
if start_local_offer {
let sdp = pc.create_offer(None).await?;
pc.set_local_description(sdp.clone()).await?;
// SDP carries host/srflx IPs and ICE ufrag/pwd; log only its size, not the body.
log::debug!("local offer SDP built ({} bytes)", sdp.sdp.len());
let k = Self::get_key_for_sdp(&sdp)?;
log::debug!("Start webrtc with local key: {}", k);
Ok(k)
} else {
let sdp = serde_json::from_str::<RTCSessionDescription>(&remote_offer)?;
pc.set_remote_description(sdp.clone()).await?;
let answer = pc.create_answer(None).await?;
pc.set_local_description(answer).await?;
log::debug!("remote offer SDP received ({} bytes)", sdp.sdp.len());
let k = Self::get_key_for_sdp(&sdp)?;
log::debug!("Start webrtc with remote key: {}", k);
Ok(k)
}
}
.await;
key = match offer_answer {
Ok(k) => k,
Err(e) => {
pc.close().await.ok();
return Err(e);
}
};
let webrtc_stream = Self {
pc,
@@ -407,8 +514,30 @@ impl WebRTCStream {
local_ice_rx: Arc::new(StdMutex::new(Some(ice_rx))),
session_key: key.clone(),
send_timeout: ms_timeout,
relay_only: force_relay,
detached: Arc::new(Mutex::new(None)),
recv_state: Arc::new(Mutex::new(RecvState::default())),
peer_verified: Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false)),
};
final_lock.insert(key, webrtc_stream.clone());
// Insert into the session cache, but never `await pc.close()` while holding this lock:
// `close()` fires the peer-connection-state handler inline, which itself locks SESSIONS,
// self-deadlocking the whole process. Resolve any duplicate off-lock.
let cache_key = Self::cache_key(&key, start_local_offer);
let duplicate = {
let mut final_lock = SESSIONS.lock().await;
if let Some(session) = final_lock.get(&cache_key) {
Some(session.clone())
} else {
final_lock.insert(cache_key, webrtc_stream.clone());
None
}
};
if let Some(session) = duplicate {
// A concurrent `new()` already cached an equivalent stream; discard this pc's
// resources (off-lock) and return the cached one.
webrtc_stream.close().await;
return Ok(session);
}
Ok(webrtc_stream)
}
@@ -426,12 +555,58 @@ impl WebRTCStream {
#[inline]
pub async fn set_remote_endpoint(&self, endpoint: &str) -> ResultType<()> {
let offer = Self::get_remote_offer(endpoint)?;
log::debug!("WebRTC set remote sdp: {}", offer);
log::debug!("WebRTC set remote sdp ({} bytes)", offer.len());
let sdp = serde_json::from_str::<RTCSessionDescription>(&offer)?;
self.pc.set_remote_description(sdp).await?;
Ok(())
}
/// DTLS certificate fingerprint of the local description (this endpoint's own cert).
#[inline]
pub async fn local_dtls_fingerprint(&self) -> ResultType<String> {
Self::get_key_for_peer(&self.pc, true).await
}
/// DTLS certificate fingerprint of the remote description (the peer's cert). webrtc-rs
/// verifies the negotiated peer certificate against this fingerprint during the DTLS
/// handshake, so once the channel is open a matching fingerprint identifies the peer's cert.
#[inline]
pub async fn remote_dtls_fingerprint(&self) -> ResultType<String> {
Self::get_key_for_peer(&self.pc, false).await
}
/// Whether the established connection runs through a TURN relay: `Some(true)` when the pc is
/// Relay-policy (TURN is the only possibility) or the selected ICE candidate pair uses a
/// relay candidate; `None` before a pair is selected. Feeds the UI's direct/relayed flag.
pub async fn is_relayed(&self) -> Option<bool> {
if self.relay_only {
return Some(true);
}
let dtls = self.pc.sctp().transport();
dtls.ice_transport().get_selected_candidate_pair().await?;
// webrtc 0.13 keeps RTCIceCandidatePair's candidates private. Its stats report exposes
// the selected (nominated) pair and the corresponding candidate types instead.
let stats = self.pc.get_stats().await;
let pair = stats.reports.values().find_map(|report| match report {
StatsReportType::CandidatePair(pair) if pair.nominated => Some(pair),
_ => None,
})?;
let is_relay = |candidate_id: &str| {
matches!(
stats.reports.get(candidate_id),
Some(
StatsReportType::LocalCandidate(candidate)
| StatsReportType::RemoteCandidate(candidate)
) if RTCIceCandidateType::from(candidate.candidate_type)
== RTCIceCandidateType::Relay
)
};
Some(
is_relay(&pair.local_candidate_id) || is_relay(&pair.remote_candidate_id),
)
}
#[inline]
pub fn take_local_ice_rx(&self) -> Option<mpsc::UnboundedReceiver<String>> {
self.local_ice_rx.lock().ok().and_then(|mut rx| rx.take())
@@ -464,6 +639,19 @@ impl WebRTCStream {
Ok(())
}
/// Explicitly tear down the peer connection.
///
/// Dropping a `WebRTCStream` handle is not enough to release the underlying
/// `RTCPeerConnection`: the global `SESSIONS` map holds a clone, so the pc (and its
/// ICE/DTLS/STUN resources) would stay alive until it happens to reach a terminal ICE
/// state. Closing here fires `on_peer_connection_state_change`, which removes the
/// `SESSIONS` entry, so callers that abandon a stream (e.g. a raced offerer that lost to
/// another transport) should call this to avoid leaking it.
#[inline]
pub async fn close(&self) {
self.pc.close().await.ok();
}
#[inline]
pub fn set_raw(&mut self) {
// not-supported
@@ -481,14 +669,16 @@ impl WebRTCStream {
#[inline]
pub fn set_key(&mut self, _key: Key) {
// not-supported
// WebRTC uses built-in DTLS encryption for secure communication.
// DTLS handles key exchange and encryption automatically, so explicit key management is not required.
// WebRTC traffic is DTLS-encrypted regardless; the secretbox key is unused.
// Callers invoke set_key only after the controller has bound the DTLS fingerprint to the
// verified peer identity (or the controlled side has completed the matching handshake).
// Mark peer-verified so is_secured() matches TCP's post-key-exchange meaning.
self.peer_verified.store(true, Ordering::Release);
}
#[inline]
pub fn is_secured(&self) -> bool {
true
self.peer_verified.load(Ordering::Acquire)
}
#[inline]
@@ -515,20 +705,73 @@ impl WebRTCStream {
}
}
pub async fn send_bytes(&mut self, bytes: Bytes) -> ResultType<()> {
if let Err(err) = self.wait_connected(self.send_timeout).await {
self.pc.close().await.ok();
let kind = if err.to_string().contains("deadline")
|| err.to_string().contains("timeout")
{
ErrorKind::TimedOut
} else {
ErrorKind::Other
};
return Err(Error::new(kind, err.to_string()).into());
/// Fetch (and cache) the detached data channel. `detach()` is idempotent and returns a
/// clone of the same underlying channel, so caching it just avoids re-locking per message.
async fn detached_dc(&self) -> ResultType<Arc<DetachedDataChannel>> {
{
let cache = self.detached.lock().await;
if let Some(dc) = cache.as_ref() {
return Ok(dc.clone());
}
}
let raw = self.stream.lock().await.clone();
let dc = raw.detach().await?;
let mut cache = self.detached.lock().await;
// Another task may have cached it while we were detaching.
if let Some(existing) = cache.as_ref() {
return Ok(existing.clone());
}
*cache = Some(dc.clone());
Ok(dc)
}
pub async fn send_bytes(&mut self, bytes: Bytes) -> ResultType<()> {
let send_timeout = self.send_timeout;
// Bound the WHOLE data-channel send (wait-for-open + every write) by send_timeout,
// mirroring FramedStream. Without this a write can park indefinitely on SCTP
// pending-queue backpressure and connection.rs's timeout timer never runs.
if send_timeout > 0 {
match timeout(
Duration::from_millis(send_timeout),
self.send_bytes_inner(bytes),
)
.await
{
Ok(res) => res,
Err(_) => {
self.pc.close().await.ok();
Err(Error::new(ErrorKind::TimedOut, "WebRTC send timeout").into())
}
}
} else {
self.send_bytes_inner(bytes).await
}
}
async fn send_bytes_inner(&mut self, bytes: Bytes) -> ResultType<()> {
if bytes.len() > MAX_FRAME_LENGTH {
return Err(Error::new(ErrorKind::InvalidInput, "Overflow").into());
}
self.wait_for_connect_result().await?;
let dc = self.detached_dc().await?;
let data = bytes.as_ref();
let mut offset = 0;
// Always emit at least one fragment (a lone FRAG_END header for an empty message), so a
// zero-length data-channel message — which the receiver cannot distinguish from EOF — is
// never sent.
loop {
let end = (offset + MAX_FRAGMENT_PAYLOAD).min(data.len());
let is_last = end >= data.len();
let chunk = &data[offset..end];
let mut framed = BytesMut::with_capacity(1 + chunk.len());
framed.put_u8(if is_last { FRAG_END } else { FRAG_MORE });
framed.put_slice(chunk);
dc.write(&framed.freeze()).await?;
offset = end;
if is_last {
break;
}
}
let stream = self.stream.lock().await.clone();
stream.send(&bytes).await?;
Ok(())
}
@@ -538,30 +781,53 @@ impl WebRTCStream {
self.pc.close().await.ok();
return Some(Err(Error::new(ErrorKind::Other, err.to_string())));
}
let stream = self.stream.lock().await.clone();
// TODO reuse buffer?
let mut buffer = BytesMut::zeroed(DATA_CHANNEL_BUFFER_SIZE as usize);
let dc = stream.detach().await.ok()?;
let n = match dc.read(&mut buffer).await {
Ok(n) => n,
let dc = match self.detached_dc().await {
Ok(dc) => dc,
Err(err) => {
self.pc.close().await.ok();
return Some(Err(Error::new(ErrorKind::Other, err.to_string())));
}
};
// Hold recv_state across the reassembly loop: the accumulator must survive `next()`
// cancellation (e.g. next_timeout) so already-read fragments are not lost mid-message.
let mut st = self.recv_state.lock().await;
if st.scratch.len() < RECV_BUF_SIZE {
st.scratch.resize(RECV_BUF_SIZE, 0);
}
loop {
let RecvState { acc, scratch } = &mut *st;
let n = match dc.read(scratch.as_mut_slice()).await {
Ok(n) => n,
Err(err) => {
self.pc.close().await.ok();
return Some(Err(Error::new(
ErrorKind::Other,
format!("data channel read error: {}", err),
)));
}
};
if n == 0 {
// Clean EOF: the remote reset the stream or shut its write half. An empty logical
// message is represented by a 1-byte header, so it is never confused with EOF.
self.pc.close().await.ok();
return None;
}
acc.extend_from_slice(&scratch[1..n]);
// Match TCP's maximum frame size while preventing an unbounded FRAG_MORE stream from
// exhausting memory.
if acc.len() > MAX_FRAME_LENGTH {
acc.clear();
self.pc.close().await.ok();
return Some(Err(Error::new(
ErrorKind::Other,
format!("data channel read error: {}", err),
"WebRTC reassembled message exceeded maximum frame size",
)));
}
};
if n == 0 {
self.pc.close().await.ok();
return Some(Err(Error::new(
ErrorKind::Other,
"data channel read exited with 0 bytes",
)));
if scratch[0] == FRAG_END {
let msg = std::mem::take(acc);
return Some(Ok(msg));
}
}
buffer.truncate(n);
Some(Ok(buffer))
}
#[inline]
@@ -583,6 +849,8 @@ mod tests {
use crate::config;
use crate::webrtc::WebRTCStream;
use crate::webrtc::DEFAULT_ICE_SERVERS;
use std::time::Duration;
use tokio::time::timeout;
use webrtc::peer_connection::sdp::session_description::RTCSessionDescription;
#[test]
@@ -841,4 +1109,81 @@ IHR5cCBzcmZseCByYWRkciAwLjAuMC4wIHJwb3J0IDY0MDA4XHJcbmE9ZW5kLW9mLWNhbmRpZGF0ZXNc
let err = stream.wait_connected(10).await.unwrap_err();
assert!(err.to_string().contains("timeout"));
}
async fn connect_loopback() -> (WebRTCStream, WebRTCStream) {
let mut offerer = WebRTCStream::new("", false, 20000).await.unwrap();
let offer = offerer.get_local_endpoint().await.unwrap();
let answerer = WebRTCStream::new(&offer, false, 20000).await.unwrap();
let answer = answerer.get_local_endpoint().await.unwrap();
offerer.set_remote_endpoint(&answer).await.unwrap();
// Bridge trickle candidates directly between the two peers, both directions.
let mut off_ice = offerer.take_local_ice_rx().unwrap();
let mut ans_ice = answerer.take_local_ice_rx().unwrap();
let answerer_for_ice = answerer.clone();
let offerer_for_ice = offerer.clone();
tokio::spawn(async move {
while let Some(c) = off_ice.recv().await {
let _ = answerer_for_ice.add_remote_ice_candidate(&c).await;
}
});
tokio::spawn(async move {
while let Some(c) = ans_ice.recv().await {
let _ = offerer_for_ice.add_remote_ice_candidate(&c).await;
}
});
offerer.wait_connected(20000).await.unwrap();
let mut answerer = answerer;
answerer.wait_connected(20000).await.unwrap();
(offerer, answerer)
}
// In-process offerer<->answerer loopback exercising the send/next data plane that the framing,
// empty-message, and EOF fixes live in. Connects over host candidates (works offline; any
// configured/default STUN just fails in the background without blocking the host pair).
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_webrtc_loopback_roundtrip() {
let connect = async {
let (mut offerer, mut answerer) = connect_loopback().await;
// Host-candidate loopback is direct, never TURN-relayed.
assert_eq!(offerer.is_relayed().await, Some(false));
// Small message.
offerer.send_raw(b"hello".to_vec()).await.unwrap();
let got = answerer.next().await.unwrap().unwrap();
assert_eq!(&got[..], b"hello");
// Empty message: must round-trip as an empty frame, not be seen as EOF.
offerer.send_raw(Vec::new()).await.unwrap();
let got = answerer.next().await.unwrap().unwrap();
assert_eq!(got.len(), 0, "empty message must not be treated as EOF");
// Payload far above the 64KB single-message cap: must be fragmented and reassembled.
let big = vec![0xABu8; 200_000];
offerer.send_raw(big.clone()).await.unwrap();
let got = answerer.next().await.unwrap().unwrap();
assert_eq!(got.len(), big.len(), "large message must survive fragmentation");
assert_eq!(&got[..], &big[..]);
// Reverse direction.
answerer.send_raw(b"world".to_vec()).await.unwrap();
let got = offerer.next().await.unwrap().unwrap();
assert_eq!(&got[..], b"world");
// Peer close: the other side observes a clean EOF (None) or a close error, never a hang.
offerer.close().await;
match timeout(Duration::from_secs(10), answerer.next()).await {
Ok(None) | Ok(Some(Err(_))) => {}
Ok(Some(Ok(b))) => panic!("expected EOF after peer close, got {} bytes", b.len()),
Err(_) => panic!("answerer.next() hung after peer close"),
}
answerer.close().await;
};
timeout(Duration::from_secs(40), connect)
.await
.expect("webrtc loopback did not complete in time");
}
}