moonlight-stream/moonlight-common-c
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Refactor OpenSSL usage into a platform-specific file to allow other crypto backends

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This commit is contained in:
Cameron Gutman
2021-04-17 17:47:53 -05:00
parent 5782246b30
commit d62ee951a0
6 changed files with 279 additions and 210 deletions
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119
src/ControlStream.c
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@@ -6,8 +6,6 @@
#include <enet/enet.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
// NV control stream packet header for TCP
typedef struct _NVCTL_TCP_PACKET_HEADER {
unsigned short type;
@@ -65,11 +63,8 @@ static int currentEnetSequenceNumber;
static bool idrFrameRequired;
static LINKED_BLOCKING_QUEUE invalidReferenceFrameTuples;
static EVP_CIPHER_CTX* cipherContext;
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
#define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(x) EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(x); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(x)
#endif
static PPLT_CRYPTO_CONTEXT encryptionCtx;
static PPLT_CRYPTO_CONTEXT decryptionCtx;
#define CONN_IMMEDIATE_POOR_LOSS_RATE 30
#define CONN_CONSECUTIVE_POOR_LOSS_RATE 15
@@ -251,7 +246,8 @@ int initializeControlStream(void) {
lastConnectionStatusUpdate = CONN_STATUS_OKAY;
currentEnetSequenceNumber = 0;
usePeriodicPing = APP_VERSION_AT_LEAST(7, 1, 415);
cipherContext = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
encryptionCtx = PltCreateCryptoContext();
decryptionCtx = PltCreateCryptoContext();
return 0;
}
@@ -269,7 +265,8 @@ void freeFrameInvalidationList(PLINKED_BLOCKING_QUEUE_ENTRY entry) {
// Cleans up control stream
void destroyControlStream(void) {
LC_ASSERT(stopping);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(cipherContext);
PltDestroyCryptoContext(encryptionCtx);
PltDestroyCryptoContext(decryptionCtx);
PltCloseEvent(&invalidateRefFramesEvent);
freeFrameInvalidationList(LbqDestroyLinkedBlockingQueue(&invalidReferenceFrameTuples));
PltDeleteMutex(&enetMutex);
@@ -390,57 +387,23 @@ static PNVCTL_TCP_PACKET_HEADER readNvctlPacketTcp(void) {
}
static bool encryptControlMessage(PNVCTL_ENCRYPTED_PACKET_HEADER encPacket, PNVCTL_ENET_PACKET_HEADER_V2 packet) {
bool ret = false;
int len;
unsigned char iv[16];
int encryptedSize = sizeof(*packet) + packet->payloadLength;
// This is a truncating cast, but it's what Nvidia does, so we have to mimic it.
memset(iv, 0, sizeof(iv));
iv[0] = (unsigned char)encPacket->seq;
if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(cipherContext, EVP_aes_128_gcm(), NULL, NULL, NULL) != 1) {
goto gcm_cleanup;
}
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cipherContext, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IVLEN, 16, NULL) != 1) {
goto gcm_cleanup;
}
if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(cipherContext, NULL, NULL,
(const unsigned char*)StreamConfig.remoteInputAesKey, iv) != 1) {
goto gcm_cleanup;
}
// Encrypt into the space after the encrypted header and GCM tag
int encryptedSize = sizeof(*packet) + packet->payloadLength;
if (EVP_EncryptUpdate(cipherContext, ((unsigned char*)(encPacket + 1)) + AES_GCM_TAG_LENGTH,
&encryptedSize, (const unsigned char*)packet, encryptedSize) != 1) {
goto gcm_cleanup;
}
// GCM encryption won't ever fill ciphertext here but we have to call it anyway
if (EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(cipherContext, ((unsigned char*)(encPacket + 1)), &len) != 1) {
goto gcm_cleanup;
}
LC_ASSERT(len == 0);
// Read the tag into the space after the encrypted header
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cipherContext, EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG, 16, (unsigned char*)(encPacket + 1)) != 1) {
ret = -1;
goto gcm_cleanup;
}
ret = true;
gcm_cleanup:
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(cipherContext);
return ret;
return PltEncryptMessage(encryptionCtx, ALGORITHM_AES_GCM,
(unsigned char*)StreamConfig.remoteInputAesKey, sizeof(StreamConfig.remoteInputAesKey),
iv, sizeof(iv),
(unsigned char*)(encPacket + 1), AES_GCM_TAG_LENGTH, // Write tag into the space after the encrypted header
(unsigned char*)packet, encryptedSize,
((unsigned char*)(encPacket + 1)) + AES_GCM_TAG_LENGTH, &encryptedSize); // Write ciphertext after the GCM tag
}
// Caller must free() *packet on success!!!
static bool decryptControlMessageToV1(PNVCTL_ENCRYPTED_PACKET_HEADER encPacket, PNVCTL_ENET_PACKET_HEADER_V1* packet, int* packetLength) {
bool ret = false;
int len;
unsigned char iv[16];
*packet = NULL;
@@ -458,60 +421,28 @@ static bool decryptControlMessageToV1(PNVCTL_ENCRYPTED_PACKET_HEADER encPacket,
memset(iv, 0, sizeof(iv));
iv[0] = (unsigned char)encPacket->seq;
if (EVP_DecryptInit_ex(cipherContext, EVP_aes_128_gcm(), NULL, NULL, NULL) != 1) {
goto gcm_cleanup;
}
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cipherContext, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IVLEN, 16, NULL) != 1) {
goto gcm_cleanup;
}
if (EVP_DecryptInit_ex(cipherContext, NULL, NULL,
(const unsigned char*)StreamConfig.remoteInputAesKey, iv) != 1) {
goto gcm_cleanup;
}
int plaintextLength = encPacket->length - sizeof(encPacket->seq) - AES_GCM_TAG_LENGTH;
*packet = malloc(plaintextLength);
if (*packet == NULL) {
goto gcm_cleanup;
return false;
}
// Decrypt into the packet we allocated
if (EVP_DecryptUpdate(cipherContext, (unsigned char*)*packet, &plaintextLength,
((unsigned char*)(encPacket + 1)) + AES_GCM_TAG_LENGTH, plaintextLength) != 1) {
goto gcm_cleanup;
if (!PltDecryptMessage(decryptionCtx, ALGORITHM_AES_GCM,
(unsigned char*)StreamConfig.remoteInputAesKey, sizeof(StreamConfig.remoteInputAesKey),
iv, sizeof(iv),
(unsigned char*)(encPacket + 1), AES_GCM_TAG_LENGTH, // The tag is located right after the header
((unsigned char*)(encPacket + 1)) + AES_GCM_TAG_LENGTH, plaintextLength, // The ciphertext is after the tag
(unsigned char*)*packet, &plaintextLength)) {
free(*packet);
return false;
}
// Set the GCM tag before calling EVP_DecryptFinal_ex()
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cipherContext, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG, 16, (unsigned char*)(encPacket + 1)) != 1) {
ret = -1;
goto gcm_cleanup;
}
// GCM will never have additional plaintext here, but we need to call it to
// ensure that the GCM authentication tag is correct for this data.
if (EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(cipherContext, (unsigned char*)*packet, &len) != 1) {
goto gcm_cleanup;
}
LC_ASSERT(len == 0);
// Now we do an in-place V2 to V1 header conversion, so our existing parsing code doesn't have to change.
// All we need to do is eliminate the new length field in V2 by shifting everything by 2 bytes.
memmove(((unsigned char*)*packet) + 2, ((unsigned char*)*packet) + 4, plaintextLength - 4);
*packetLength = plaintextLength - 2;
ret = true;
gcm_cleanup:
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(cipherContext);
if (!ret && *packet) {
free(*packet);
*packet = NULL;
}
return ret;
return true;
}
static bool sendMessageEnet(short ptype, short paylen, const void* payload) {
@@ -760,16 +691,12 @@ static void controlReceiveThreadFunc(void* context) {
continue;
}
// We (ab)use this lock to protect the cryptoContext too
PltLockMutex(&enetMutex);
ctlHdr = NULL;
if (!decryptControlMessageToV1((PNVCTL_ENCRYPTED_PACKET_HEADER)event.packet->data, &ctlHdr, &packetLength)) {
PltUnlockMutex(&enetMutex);
Limelog("Failed to decrypt control packet of size %d\n", event.packet->dataLength);
enet_packet_destroy(event.packet);
continue;
}
PltUnlockMutex(&enetMutex);
}
else {
// What do we do here???